



**RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPABILITIES, STRUCTURES AND STAFFING**




**Army Capability:**

Protected Mobility delivered by Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC)



**Naval Service Capability:**

Maritime Drug Interdiction



**Air Corps Capability:**


Emergency Aeromedical Service

## STAFFING AND INEXPERIENCE

The White Paper states that ‘*the most fundamental requirement and a critical factor for success is well trained, motivated, experienced and capable personnel with a wide range of skills and experience in order to successfully deliver government requirements*’.

**24% of all operational personnel in the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service have five years’ service or less. 29% of all Commissioned officers have less than 5 years’ service.**


This has severe implications for governance and supervision and increases organisational risk.



## DEFENCE FUNDING

Government spending on Defence, at 0.27% of GDP, is dangerously inadequate. Most other EU countries spend at least 4 times more than Ireland on Defence (the EU average is 1.2%), and the Commission must examine this discrepancy. What defence services do we not provide the citizens of this State that other EU armed forces provide, and does this capability gap pose any strategic risks to Ireland and our EU partners?

What do WE want to happen?



## TURNOVER

The Defence Forces have been suffering since 2016 from a **Dysfunctional Cycle of Turnover**. This has led to an ever decreasing pool of suitably qualified and experienced personnel, and in an organisation whose stock in trade is the profession of arms and the management and execution of lethal force, this is a grave risk. Since 01 January 2016 the organisation has inducted 3,116 personnel while losing 3,679 (41% of the average strength for those 5 years) and currently 24% of DF strength is made up of personnel with less than five years' experience.

The upshot is that, at the current turnover rate of 7.5%, if the DF were to induct 700 personnel<sup>1</sup> each and every year, strength will continue to slowly decline, and the Defence Forces will not meet its assigned minimum strength until after the year 2050. With a more realistic and sustainable induction rate of 600 per annum, the DF turnover rate must reduce to 5% if 9,500 is to be reached by 2026.




Figure 1: Future strength at current Turnover Rate (TR)

<sup>1</sup> There were 607 inductions in 2019 (net strength loss 275), and 538 in 2020 (net strength loss 98).

**HR STRUCTURES**

The Establishment of the Defence Forces needs to be significantly increased to account for the realities of service. The operational strength in units bears no resemblance to establishment or ‘strength on paper’. Trainees (Recruits, Cadets and Apprentices) should NOT be part of the DF established strength as this provides a misleading perspective on the strength and health of the organisation.

The Personnel Management System does not account for personnel serving overseas, training for overseas out of the unit, on courses, on sick leave, on leaves of absence, or in third level education. When one looks at the figures of any rank in any unit, they will see that the unit is understaffed. But in reality, the unit will be dangerously understaffed because of the amount of people that are ‘on paper’ in the unit but are not actually present. CS4 needs to have a margin of flexibility for personnel management.




Figure 5: Officer % Strength in Station by Service

The following chart shows the gaps in technical officer strength. We aspire to be tech enabled but cannot train and retain sufficient technicians to maintain our current equipment. Technician training and incentivised retention packages<sup>2</sup> are required for specialists.




Figure 4: Technician Officer Strength in Station

<sup>2</sup> See Annex D: Case for Service Commitment Scheme for Specialist Service Officers submitted to PMO in November 2019.

**AN UNDERSTRENGTH ORGANISATION**




Figure 6:

Average Captain strength in Army Line Operational Units is **51.4%**.

Only 1 unit out of 13 (**7.7%**) is at full Captain strength.




Figure 7:

NS Overall Strength **81.8%**

NS Operational Strength **66.3%**

Air Corps Overall Strength **85.3%**

AC Operational Strength **74.3%**




Figure 8:

Army Overall Strength **92%**

Army Operational Strength **88.5%**

Army Operational Strength less Overseas **80%**


**Conclusion: Services, Corps and Units are operating with no Slack/Resilience and are unable to withstand unforeseen shocks without completely impacting on or replacing another tasking.**

# Government’s High Level Implementation Plan

## ‘Strengthening our Defence Forces’




The plan has been allowed to fail, through a lack of institutional and political will to resource it, and an absence of meaningful oversight. The Defence Organisation, comprising the Department of Defence and senior military management have not been able to realise this ‘Ultimate Goal’, and that is why you are here. RACO had to sell to our members a false promise of significant improvements that never materialised. Having **8 of 15 projects still behind schedule 19 months into any project management process** would be unacceptable at any time, but the fact that this is occurring in a Government-sponsored plan supposedly sponsored and monitored by the Taoiseach’s Department, in the face of the well documented DF recruitment and retention crisis is unconscionable. The inadequate response to this burning platform flies in the face of repeated government commitments to a Defence Force of minimum 9,500 personnel and does not bode well for future expansion to meet unmet defence and security needs that this Commission will surely identify. RACO firmly believes, however, that while the implementation of the plan has been unsuccessful, many of the initiatives identified can still bear fruit if given the time, resources, and energy they require.



## SINGLE PENSION SCHEME AND SUPPLEMENTARY PENSION FOR POST 2013 OFFICERS

The absence of a supplementary pension means that in the future fast accrual employees may be forced to retire at an age much younger than the entitlement to a State Pension and left for many years with a pension only a small fraction of their pre-retirement pay. Our projections indicate that the initial pension will be 20% of pay from age 58 as opposed to an initial rate of pension of 42% of pay for an equivalent public servant at the age of 68, if the supplementary pension is not payable. Conditions of employment which force employees to retire well in advance of entitlement to a State Pension which provides an initial pension of c.20% of preretirement pay and eventual pension of c.36% of preretirement pay is not fit for purpose and is not sustainable”.

This has been borne out by further research conducted by *Amárach Research* for RACO which shows that **79% of Post 2013 DF Officers are planning to leave the organisation well in advance of their mandatory retirement age, due to inadequate superannuation provisions.** This is the ticking retention time-bomb that will undo any other good work done by the Commission or any other entity. If this is not resolved, then all of the effort put in to inducting and training the recent historically large cadet classes will have been for nothing. It is the very antithesis of ‘Value for Money’. See Annexes G and H.



## **SUMMARY OF RACO PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION**

### **Establishment**

- Land Component Commander and HQ Staff
- NS and AC Joint Force HQ staffs.
- Junior Officers Overseas establishment (50). Similar provision for NCOs.
- Training Establishment for personnel in full time induction training (500)
- Personnel on Career or Professional Development Courses (50 officers)
- Staff in Induction / Professional Training Depots at Brigade and Formation level, and exercise support Battalion in DFTC.
- Intelligence SOF and Cyber establishment increases
- Portlaoise Prison Establishment
- Reserve Directorate and sufficient PDF Cadre
- Increase in establishment to cater for Protective Leave (maternity, Paternity, Parental, Carers, etc.) and Leave of Absence for Domestic reasons

### **Remuneration and Superannuation**

- Immediate establishment of an Independent Pay Review Body, to make the DF an 'Employer of Choice'. This entity must recognise and compensate for the unique nature of military service.
- Immediate implementation of the Working Time Directive, including payment of Overtime where WTD limits are breached.
- Provision of suitable subsidised affordable accommodation to facilitate and support domestic postings. Provision of adequate Married quarters and Single Accommodation in garrisons.
- Payment of Supplementary Pension for Post 2013 officers
- Payment of Specialised Instructor Allowance to Officers

### **Legislation**

- Defence Act is amended to reflect the appointment having Operational Command and Control over the DF (COS becomes a CHOD)
- The provision of operational budget for which the CHOD is the Accounting (and accountable) Officer)
- Employment Protection Legislation for RDF
- Enabling Legislation for Intelligence proposals

### **Financial Investment required**

- Increase in Defence spending as a percentage of GDP significantly
- Land Transport
- Strategic Airlift
- Armour/Fire Support Systems/ISTAR/CBRN
- Cyber Defence and Security
- Primary Radar & Air Intercept

### **Develop and enhance Capabilities in**

- Cyber
- Intelligence
- Search and Rescue
- Electronic Warfare
- Information Operations and PsyOps